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It is commonplace to observe that - [n]o aspect of the extension of the American
legal system beyond the territorial frontier of the United States has given rise to
so much friction as the request for documents associated with investigation and
litigation in the United States."' Broad pretrial discovery rights in civil disputes
are, of course, ingrained traits of the American legal system. Many foreign states,
however, have quite different notions of privacy and the acceptable scope of
discovery from those prevailing in the United States and have frequently reacted
with considerable displeasure to U.S. efforts to obtain discovery of materials
located within their territory.
As in other transnational litigation contexts, U.S. courts have invoked the
doctrine of international comity to moderate the conflicts that have arisen
between extraterritorial U.S. discovery orders and foreign laws and sovereign
interests. Most notably, the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in
Socigt Nationale Industrielle Agrospatiale v. U.S. District Court2 adopted an
international comity analysis for determining when extraterritorial discovery
must be sought pursuant to the Hague Evidence Convention, rather than pursuant
to direct U.S. discovery rules.3
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1. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442,
reporters' note 1 (1987).
2. 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
3. International comity has also been invoked by U.S. courts in determining the appropriate
resolution of conflicts between U.S. discovery requests and foreign nondisclosure laws or policies,
e.g., United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1968), and in considering whether
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The comity analysis applied by the Court in Arospatiale has provoked
substantial commentary. In this article we do not review that commentary or
reexamine the Arospatiale decision in any detail. Instead, we survey recent
lower court applications of the Court's comity analysis in Arospatiale and
consider what light these decisions shed upon the wisdom and utility of the
Court's analysis. Our survey shows, at least preliminarily, that the lower courts
have found the Airospatiale comity analysis cumbersome and unhelpful and have
almost uniformly refused to order extraterritorial discovery pursuant to the Hague
Evidence Convention. These findings suggest that more generally applicable
criticisms of ad hoc case-by-case comity analyses may have especial force in the
discovery context.
I. Background
International litigation in U.S. courts frequently requires access to materials or
witnesses located outside the United States. When foreign witnesses are willing
to provide evidence voluntarily for use in U.S. proceedings, U.S. litigants have
generally encountered few insurmountable difficulties in obtaining extraterritorial
discovery. Obtaining discovery from recalcitrant foreign litigants or witnesses has
often been much more problematic. For U.S. litigants seeking evidence abroad
in these circumstances, two basic routes were available historically: obtaining
"direct" discovery under U.S. procedural rules and seeking foreign judicial
assistance pursuant to letters rogatory.
United States courts have traditionally favored the use of direct discovery orders
under applicable federal or state rules of civil procedure to obtain evidence located
abroad.4 United States courts have long held that foreign litigants and witnesses
can be required, pursuant to U.S. discovery rules, to provide discovery of doc-
uments and other information, even though these are located outside the United
States.5 Direct extraterritorial discovery under U.S. procedural rules will only be
ordered, however, from persons subject to the personal jurisdiction of the U.S.
court.6 Persons subject to a court's personal jurisdiction can be required to produce
to restrict the scope of traditional U.S.-style direct discovery in deference to foreign interests, e.g.,
Garpeg, Ltd. v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 789 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
4. For a detailed discussion of U.S. extraterritorial discovery procedures, see G. BORN & D.
WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 261-309 (1989).
5. FED. R. CIv. P. 34, 45; see also 4A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 34.16 (2d ed.
1988); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2210 (1970).
6. The requirement of personal jurisdiction for purposes of discovery is generally comparable
to that for other U.S. proceedings: the person over whom jurisdiction is being asserted must have
sufficient "minimum contacts" with the forum resulting from "some act by which the defendant
purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state," and the
assertion of jurisdiction must be "reasonable." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); see
also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Ct., 480 U.S. 102, 108-12, 116-21 (1987) (separate
opinions of Justices O'Connor and Brennan concerning meaning of "minimum contacts" test in
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any discoverable information within their possession or "control," regardless
whether it is located inside or outside the United States and regardless whether
foreign law forbids its disclosure. 7 Failure to comply with extraterritorial U.S.
discovery orders is punishable by sanctions, ranging from default judgments to
monetary sanctions to less drastic measures. 8
In many circumstances, foreign persons refusing to provide information
voluntarily will not be subject to the personal jurisdiction of U.S. courts. In such
cases U.S. courts are unable to order discovery directly and must seek the
assistance of foreign courts in obtaining the sought-after evidence. The custom-
ary method of obtaining foreign judicial assistance in taking evidence abroad, in
the absence of a specific treaty obligation, has been by letter rogatory. 9 Letters
rogatory have significant disadvantages, most notably the fact that there is
generally no legal obligation for foreign courts to execute them; if compliance
occurs it is only because of the good will of the foreign tribunal. 1o
Foreign states have often reacted with hostility to unilateral U.S. efforts to
obtain discovery of evidence located on their territory. Many nations have seen
these U.S. discovery efforts as violating their "judicial sovereignty," as well as
their notions of privacy and the appropriate scope of evidence-taking. 1 Some of
these countries have responded to extraterritorial U.S. discovery by filing sharp
diplomatic protests with the United States government or, more recently, by
enacting so-called "blocking statutes" that nominally forbid compliance with
U.S. discovery orders.12
product liability context). In addition, discovery from nonparty witnesses is constrained by the
territorial limitations upon the service of subpoenas. G. BORN & D. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 271-72.
7. See Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 45 F.R.D. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1968);
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Addressed to Can. Int'l Paper Co., 72 F. Supp. 1013
(S.D.N.Y. 1947).
8. Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a U.S. court to treat the refusal of
a litigant to comply with discovery requests as a contempt of court and to issue an order dismissing
the action, placing the litigant in default, or imposing monetary fines, assuming certain facts or
precluding introduction of certain evidence. See United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 691 F.2d
1384 (1 th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1119 (1983); Socirt6 Internationale Pour Participations
Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
9. A letter rogatory is a formal request by a court of one nation to the courts of another country
for assistance in performing judicial acts. See, e.g., United States v. Paraffin Wax, 225.5 Bags, 23
F.R.D. 289 (E.D.N.Y. 1959); Danisch v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 19 F.R.D. 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1956);
Branyan v. KLM, 13 F.R.D. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); De Villeneuve v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 206
F. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1913); Gross v. Palmer, 105 F. 833 (C.C.N.D. II1. 1900).
10. See, e.g., Jones, International Judicial Assistance: Procedural Chaos and a Program for
Reform, 62 YALE L.J. 515, 529-34 (1953). Moreover, because letters rogatory are executed only in
accordance with the foreign country's own judicial procedures and customs, a U.S. litigant
frequently may not be able to obtain a verbatim transcript and may not have its own counsel conduct
the questioning. The letter rogatory process is also typically slow and unpredictable; it often requires
six months for completion, and delays of a year or more are not uncommon.
11. G. BORN & D. WESTIN, supra note 4, at 264-65.
12. Blocking statutes prohibit, as a matter of law, compliance with U.S. discovery orders for the
production of evidence located within the blocking nation's territory. All foreign blocking statutes
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II. Hague Evidence Convention
Because of widely perceived difficulties with existing mechanisms for
transnational discovery, the United States acceded to the Hague Convention on
the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (the Hague
Evidence Convention) in 1972.13 The Convention is a multilateral agreement that
prescribes procedures by which litigants involved in civil and commercial
disputes may obtain evidence from abroad. There are now some twenty parties
to the Convention, including most major Western trading states. 1 4
A primary objective of the Convention was to provide a workable and inter-
nationally acceptable mechanism for taking evidence abroad. A particular concern
was to ensure that the taking of evidence in a foreign state would be consistent
with the laws and sovereignty of that country, while nonetheless providing useful
results for foreign litigants and courts. 15 Thus, the Convention's framers were
careful to avoid offending notions of judicial sovereignty prevailing in many civil
law nations, which required that local judicial authorities supervise all evidence-
taking. 16
The principal means of evidence-taking under the Convention is through the
"Letter of Request" procedure provided by articles 1 through 14. 17 Under these
provisions, all signatory States to the Convention are required to establish "Cen-
tral Authorities'"-governmental agencies responsible for receiving incoming
Letters of Request from foreign nations and overseeing their execution. A litigant
may request the domestic court where its action is pending to transmit a Letter
of Request-seeking the production of specified materials or the taking of tes-
carry some sort of penal sanction for violating the statutory provisions forbidding disclosure.
Recently enacted foreign blocking statutes fall into three broad categories. First, some prohibit the
disclosure of documents or other information pursuant to foreign discovery orders, unless the orders
are passed through appropriate foreign governmental channels. Second, other blocking statutes provide
particular governmental agencies discretionary authority to forbid compliance with specific discovery
orders. Finally, the largest number of blocking statutes either grant administrative discretion to prohibit
disclosure of information concerning particular industries or automatically prohibit such disclosure.
13. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, Mar.
18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Hague Evidence
Convention].
14. These include: Argentina, Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France,
the Federal Republic of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway,
Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
15. Rapport de la Commission speciale, 4 CONF9RENCE DE LA HAYE DE DROIT INTIRNATIONAL
PRivE: ACTES ET DOCUMENTS DE LA ONZItME SESSION 55 (1970) (Actes et documents) [hereinafter
HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION NEGOTIATING HISTORY]. The Hague Evidence Convention Negotiating
History is a collection of reports, questionnaires, drafts, and other communications as well as
transcripts of certain negotiating sessions.
16. Id.
17. Under the second method of conducting evidence-taking permitted by the Convention, the
litigant may request a diplomatic or consular officer of the country where the action is pending to take
evidence in the foreign country to which he is accredited. See id. arts. 15-16. Under the third
method, the litigant may request that a specially appointed commissioner take evidence in the foreign
country.
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timony from a specified witness-to the Central Authority in the country where
sought-after evidence is located. 18 The foreign Central Authority then transmits
the Letter of Request to the foreign court where the witness is located, which
conducts an evidentiary proceeding and returns the completed Letter of Request
to the requesting court. 19
Importantly, the Convention offers a mechanism for compelling discovery
from recalcitrant witnesses. Thus, article 10 provides that the requested state
"shall apply the appropriate measures of compulsion in the instances and to the
same extent as are provided by its internal law" for internal proceedings.
20
Evidence taken by a foreign tribunal pursuant to a Letter of Request will
ordinarily be taken according to the procedures of the requested State.2'
In an important departure from customary modes of judicial assistance, the
Convention also requires member states to fulfill properly completed Letters of
Request. The Convention provides only a few exceptions to this rule. First, a
state may refuse to execute Letters of Request in those limited circumstances in
which it believes its "sovereignty or security are threatened. ' 22 Second, under
article 23, member states may declare that they "will not execute Letters of
Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents as
known in Common Law countries." With the exception of Czechoslovakia,
Israel, and the United States, all member states to the Convention have entered
various types of article 23 declarations. A number of these declarations provide
that the declaring State will not execute any Letter of Request seeking pretrial
discovery. Several other member states have made somewhat more limited article
23 declarations, which refuse execution of requests except for specified docu-
ments or classes of documents.2 3
18. See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 13, arts. 1-2.
19. See id. arts. 5-13.
20. This obligation, however, is subject to two conditions. First, any compulsion must be
"appropriate." Second, the requested state is only required to use the type of compulsion that its
domestic law provides for in analogous internal proceedings. Id. art. 10. Thus, the requested court
need not use compulsion in attempting to execute a Letter of Request under the Convention if
compulsory process would not be available in purely domestic proceedings.
21. Id. art. 9. In addition, however, because member states employ different methods of
evidence-taking, article 9 also provides that requested states follow a "special method or procedure"
for evidence-taking if requested by the applicant unless such procedure is "incompatible with the
internal law of the State of execution or is impossible of performance by reason of its internal practice
and procedure or by reason of practical difficulties." Thus, under this provision, counsel for U.S.
litigants can request permission, among other things, to take verbatim transcripts of witnesses'
testimony and to participate in questioning.
22. See id. art. 12. This provision has seldom been invoked and the negotiating history of the
Convention indicates that it was intended to be a narrow exception.
23. For example, the article 23 reservation of the United Kingdom provides, in relevant part:
In accordance with Article 23 Her Majesty's Government declare that the United
Kingdom will not execute Letters of Request issued for the purpose of obtaining
pre-trial discovery of documents. Her Majesty's Government further declare that Her
Majesty's Government understand "Letters of Request issued for the purpose of
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On the whole, the Convention's procedures function in an adequate fashion for
U.S. litigants. Many Letters of Request are executed in full, without substantial
delays, and many foreign courts have been willing to adopt various U.S.-style
procedures in connection with their evidence-taking. 24 Nonetheless, foreign
courts have not infrequently invoked their nation's article 23 reservation in
refusing to execute fully U.S. Letters of Request. 25 Instead, foreign courts have
sometimes either rejected U.S. Letters of Request, or restricted their scope,
typically requiring production only of specifically described documents (e.g.,
Agreement dated 1/1/88 between A and B) or of fairly well-specified and narrow
categories of documents (e.g., correspondence between A and B during May 1988
relating to a specific subject). It is this significant limitation of the Hague Evidence
Convention that has provoked much of the resistance to the Convention's use in
the United States.
III. Application of the Hague Evidence
Convention in A&ospatiale
The Hague Evidence Convention has become the subject of frequent litigation
in the United States. The principal issue in this litigation has been the so-called
"exclusivity" of the Convention-i.e., the extent to which U.S. litigants are
required to use the Convention's procedures, instead of the more customary route
of direct U.S. discovery mechanisms, in order to obtain evidence located abroad.
Before the Supreme Court's Agrospatiale decision, lower courts had reached
a variety of differing conclusions about the exclusivity of the Convention. At
least one court held that the Convention was the only permissible means for
obtaining evidence from the territory of a signatory state.26 Other courts adopted
a blanket "first-use" rule requiring exhaustion of the Convention's procedures
before resort to direct U.S. discovery, at least where use of the Convention did
not appear futile.2 7 Finally, some courts held flatly that the Convention was
obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents" for the purposes of the foregoing
Declaration as including any Letter of Request which requires a person:
a) to state what documents relevant to the proceedings to which the Letter of
Request relates are, or have been, in his possession, custody, or power; or
b) to produce any documents other than particular documents specified in the Letter
of Request as being documents appearing to the requesting court to be, or to be
likely to be, in his possession, custody or power.
24. Assuming that no foreign litigation ensues, Letters of Request are ordinarily executed in
three to six months.
25. It is important to note that the article 23 option is by its terms limited to pretrial discovery
of documents. It does not allow foreign governments to refuse to provide oral testimony and other
forms of discovery, as well as evidence-taking that is not for discovery purposes. These distinctions
have apparently not always been fully appreciated. Socirtd Nationale Industrielle Mrospatiale v.
U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 537 (1987) (erroneously stating that article 23 "enables a
contracting party to revoke its consent to treaty's procedures for pretrial discovery.").
26. Cuisinarts v. Robot Coupe, S.A., No. CV 80 0050083C (Conn. Super. Ct. July 22, 1982).
27. See, e.g., Pierburg GmbH & Co. v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 238, 186 Cal. Rptr.
876 (1982) (abuse of discretion for trial court to rule that the Hague Convention need not be complied
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simply not applicable when the recipient of the discovery request had to produce
the information in the United States, rather than on foreign territory.
28
In Societg Nationale Industrielle Arospatiale v. U.S. District Court29 the
Supreme Court held unanimously that the Hague Evidence Convention was not,
by its own terms or otherwise, the exclusive means of discovering evidence
located in a signatory state. 3° Similarly, the Court unanimously rejected the
argument that the Convention was wholly inapplicable to the discovery of
materials from abroad, merely because the recipient of the discovery request was
required to produce information in the United States. 3 1 Instead, according to the
Court, the circumstances in which Convention procedures must be used depend
on the principle of international comity, which the Court defined as "the spirit of
cooperation in which a domestic tribunal approaches the resolution of cases
touching the laws and interests of other sovereign states." 32
The Agrospatiale Court was sharply divided, however, over precisely what the
comity doctrine requires in the context of extraterritorial discovery. A five-
Justice majority held that comity requires an ad hoc, case-by-case weighing of
foreign and U.S. interests in order to determine when first-use of the Convention
is required. A four-Justice dissent took the position that comity should require a
general rule of first use of the Convention, subject to an exception for cases
where resort to the Convention would be futile.
The majority's comity analysis sought to offer something for everyone. On the
one hand the Court emphasized that the Convention only provided "optional pro-
cedures" and did not "require any contracting State to use" these procedures. 3 3 The
Court also observed that:
with by a U.S. plaintiff seeking discovery of a West German defendant); Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. Superior Court, 123 Cal. App. 3d 840, 176 Cal. Rptr. 874 (1981) (trial court
should have exercised judicial restraint based on international comity and declined to proceed other
than under the Hague Convention); Vincent v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A., 193 N.J. Super. 716,
475 A.2d 686 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984) (U.S. retailer filing third-party complaint against French
corporation required to make discovery application through Hague Convention channels); Th.
Goldschmidt A.G. v. Smith, 676 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ)
(American company required to comply with Hague Convention provisions as avenue of first resort
in seeking production of documents by West German corporation and the taking of depositions in
West Germany); Gebr. Eickhoff Maschinenfabrik und Eisengieberei GmbH v. Starcher, 328 S.E.2d
492 (W. Va. 1985) (U.S. citizen seeking discovery order against West German corporation must
resort to Hague Convention procedures until it appears such attempts have proven fruitless).
28. In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985) (German corporation subject
to jurisdiction of district court required to comply with discovery pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure); In re Messerschmitt Bolkow Blohm GmbH, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985).
29. 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
30. Id. at 539-40.
31. Id. at 541.
32. Id. at 543-46. The Court traced the comity doctrine to Ulrich Huber, a 17th century Dutch
jurist. Id. at 543 n.27; see Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REV. 9 (1966); E. LORENZEN,
Huber's De Conflictu Legum, in SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 136 (1947).
33. Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 534.
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It is well-known that the scope of American discovery is often significantly broader
than is permitted in other jurisdictions and we are satisfied that foreign tribunals will
recognize that the final decision on the evidence to be used in litigation conducted in
American courts must be made by those courts.
34
On the other hand the Court also made gestures in the direction of foreign
concerns: "American courts, in supervising pretrial proceedings, should exercise
special vigilance to protect foreign litigants from the danger that unnecessary, or
unduly burdensome, discovery may place them in a disadvantageous position,"
35
and "American courts should . . . take care to demonstrate due respect for any
special problems confronted by the foreign litigant on account of its nationality
or the location of its operations, and for any sovereign interest expressed by a
foreign State.
' 36
Against the background of these conflicting concerns, the Airospatiale majority
held that international comity required lower courts to consider a wide variety of
factors on a case-by-case basis in determining whether to conduct extraterritorial
discovery pursuant to the Convention or pursuant to direct U.S. discovery rules.
Among other things, the Court's comity analysis required lower courts to con-
sider: (a) the sovereign interests of the United States; 37 (b) the sovereign interests
of the relevant foreign State; 38 (c) the likelihood that resort to the Convention's
procedures would prove effective in a particular case; 39 (d) the breadth and
intrusiveness of the requested discovery; 40 and (e) the peculiar problems and
burdens that foreign litigants might confront when faced by U.S.-style discovery
requests. 4 1 Having catalogued the considerations that might affect the determi-
nation whether to require first use of the Convention, the Court flatly refused to
provide any guidance as to the results that these factors might produce in particular
cases: "We do not articulate specific rules to guide this delicate task of
adjudication." 42 Indeed, apart from a general aura of hostility towards the Con-
vention, the Court provided virtually no hint as to whether the Convention
- generally should or should not be used, either for all or some types of discovery.
Four Justices dissented from the portion of the Court's opinion adopting a
case-by-case comity analysis. The dissent reasoned that "[t]he principle of
34. Id. at 542.
35. Id. at 546.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 544.
38. Id.
39. Id. ("likelihood that resort to those procedures will prove effective"); id. n.28 (quoting
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED) § 437(t)(c) (Tent. Draft No. 7, (1986)).
40. Id. The Court observed that "[slome discovery procedures are much more 'intrusive' than
others," and suggested that even though a particularly burdensome document request might be
required to be fulfilled pursuant to the Convention, "the court might well refuse to insist upon the
use of Convention procedures before requiring responses to simple interrogatories or requests for
admissions." Id. at 545-46.
41. Id.
42. ld. at 546.
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comity leads to more definite rules than the ad hoc approach endorsed by the
majority." 43 It instead urged a general rule requiring first use of the Convention
except where there were "strong indications that no evidence would be
forthcoming. ' 4 4 The dissent warned that "[e]xperience to date indicates that
there is a large risk that a case-by-case comity analysis ...will be performed
inadequately and that the somewhat unfamiliar procedures of the Convention will
be invoked infrequently."
45
IV. Lower Court Applications of Arospatiale
Although the Agrospatiale case provoked substantial commentary-both
before and after the Supreme Court's decision-relatively little attention has
been given to lower court efforts to apply the Aerospatiale comity analysis. The
lower courts have rendered ten published decisions concerning the Convention in
the two years since the Supreme Court decided Agrospatiale. These opinions,
together with those unpublished decisions that have come to our attention,
provide the basis for some preliminary observations about the wisdom and utility
of the comity analysis adopted by the Aerospatiale decision.
On a general level, four related aspects of post-Arospatiale lower court
decisions give rise to fairly fundamental concerns about the workability of the
Court's ad hoc balancing analysis. First, lower courts appear to have found the
Agrospatiale comity analysis cumbersome and unhelpful. One lower court com-
mented that "[r]egrettably, the [Supreme] Court [in Agrospatiale] declined to set
forth specific rules to guide" a comity analysis.4 6 Another court flatly refused to
apply the analysis, choosing instead to follow the first-use rule urged in Justice
Blackmun's dissent in Aerospatiale.47 The e ! trial court decisions that do attempt
to apply the Court's comity analysis frequi ntly offer little more than conclusory
generalizations about foreign and U.S. irnterests. 4
Second, post-Arospatiale decisions have almost uniformly held that the party
seeking to require first use of the Convention bears the burden of proof that comity
requires such a result. As one court i ioned, "[t]he proponent of using the Hague
Evidence Convention bears the burden of demonstrating the necessity of using
43. Id. at 554.
44. Id. at 566-67.
45. Id. at 548.
46. Scarminach v. Goldwell GmbH, 140 Misc. 2d 103, 531 N.Y.S.2d 188, 189 (Sup. Ct. 1988);
cf. Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp., 118 F.R.D. 386, 389 n.2 (D.N.J. 1987) ("Justice
Blackmun's [dissenting] opinion certainly is thoughtful and well-reasoned.").
47. Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter GmbH & Co., 117 F.R.D. 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1987).
48. E.g., Haynes v. Kleinwefers, 119 F.R.D. 335 (E.D.N.Y. 1988).
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those procedures.' 49 This result has been explained both by the apparent impli-
cation of a passage in the Agrospatiale majority opinion and by a perception that
foreign litigants are in the better position to prove the existence of foreign
sovereign interests that might require resort to the Convention. 50 Although placing
the burden of proof on the party urging direct U.S. discovery would appear most
consistent with the Court's comity principle, only one lower court has reached
this conclusion.
5 1
Third, U.S. courts have virtually never required litigants to forgo direct ex-
traterritorial discovery from foreign witnesses and instead resort in the first
instance to the Convention's procedures. 52 Indeed, apparently only one reported
decision requires first use of the Convention. Ironically, this decision comes close
to being the exception that proves the rule: it relies on Justice Blackmun's dissent
in Mrospatiale, rather than on the Court's comity analysis.53 In five other
published cases courts have concluded that comity does not require first use of the
Convention to obtain discovery from a litigant. 54 Almost all of these decisions
have relied in large part on their perception that direct discovery under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is substantially quicker and more efficient than discovery
under the Convention. 55 In particular, lower U.S. courts have ruled that the
existence of a blanket article 23 reservation by the nation where requested
49. Rich v. KIS Cal., Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 257-58 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Benton, 118 F.R.D. at
389 & n.2; Scarminach, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 190-91; see Transcript, supra note 54.
50. Several lower courts have relied upon the language used by the Supreme Court in
Agrospatiale in rejecting the court of appeals' rule because it "would deny the foreign litigant a full
and fair opportunity to demonstrate appropriate reasons for employing Convention procedures in the
first instance." Agrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 547.
51. Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter GmbH & Co., 117 F.R.D. 33 (N.D.N.Y. 1987).
52. Of course, where discovery is to occur physically on foreign territory, as in the holding of
a deposition abroad, U.S. courts have required use of the Convention. See Scotch Whiskey Ass'n v.
Majestic Distilling Co., No. 88-808 (D. Md. Nov. 30, 1988) (depositions in England); Jenco v.
Martech Int'l, Inc., 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4727 (E.D. La. May 20, 1988) (depositions in Norway).
53. Hudson, 117 F.R.D. at 33.
54. Haynes, 119 F.R.D. at 335 (interrogatories and document requests from Germany); Rich v.
KIS Cal., Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254 (M.D.N.C. 1988) (interrogatories from France); Benton, 118
F.R.D. at 386 (interrogatories and document requests from Sweden); Scarminach, 531 N.Y.S.2d at
188 (interrogatories and document request from Germany); Sandsend Fin. Consultants, Ltd. v.
Wood, 743 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no writ) (deposition and document
request from Channel Islands). Similarly, the unpublished decisions that the authors are aware of have
not required first use of the Convention. See also Transcript of hearing on motions July 24, 1989,
Manoir-Electroalloys Corp. v. Amalloy Corp., 711 F. Supp. 188 (D.N.J. 1989) No. 88-4707
(ordering direct discovery from France) [hereinafter Transcript].
55. See, e.g., Benton, 118 F.R.D. at 391 ("The [affidavit of an official Swedish of the Foreign
Ministry] states that the defendant's letter of request should be processed by the Swedish authorities
in approximately two months. That is an approximation based upon past history; there are certainly
no guarantees. This case has already endured numerous delays and discovery should proceed apace.
Another delay while the Swedish authorities determine what discovery will be permitted and the
further litigation undoubtedly spawned by their decision may bring actual discovery to a standstill.");
Transcript, supra note 54, at 17 (COURT: "Are you seriously suggesting that the Hague Convention
is a speedy process?").
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evidence is located reduces the Convention's value to U.S. litigants so signifi-
cantly that first use of the Convention is not a tenable alternative to direct
discovery. 56 In one court's words, "since documents are sought, it is not at all
certain in view of Germany's Article 33 [sic] declaration, that the plaintiff would
obtain the information he seeks through use of the Convention provisions."
5 7
Importantly, however, this conclusion has also been reached in cases where no
blanket article 23 reservation is involved or where discovery other than document
discovery is sought. 58 Lower courts have thus far found no need to draw dis-
tinctions between the efficacy of different types of discovery under the Conven-
tion; they have concluded simply that the Convention is not comparable in
expedition or efficiency to U.S.-style discovery, and thus have been disinclined
to require use of the Convention.
And fourth, appellate court review of lower court decisions promises to be
nonexistent, owing to the broad discretion that trial judges enjoy under the
Aerospatiale analysis. 59 According to one court of appeals, the "[dlistrict court
has complete discretion to determine the most appropriate manner of producing
evidence in cases before it. ' 6" To date, no appellate court has reversed a trial
court's application of Aerospatiale.
These difficulties that trial and appellate courts have encountered in applying
the Agrospatiale comity analysis would be troubling even taken by themselves.
They raise special concerns, however, because of the serious criticisms-both
academic and practical-that have been levelled more generally against other
comity-based ad hoc balancing tests. Simply put, these criticisms have chal-
lenged the ability of district judges accurately to identify and assess foreign
sovereign interests or neutrally to weigh those interests against U.S. interests.
61
Lower court applications of the ad hoc Agrospatiale balancing analysis do little
to allay these concerns. The almost inevitable predisposition of trial judges to
ignore the Convention suggests that doubts about parochial bias may well have
some substance. These questions are reinforced by the lower courts' nearly
unanimous conclusion-apparently based on little more than surmise, and
applied without regard to the specific type of discovery or article 23 reservation
at issue-that the Convention will be slow and inefficient. And finally, the
56. E.g., Haynes v. Kleinwefers, 119 F.R.D. 335, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Scarminach, 531
N.Y.S.2d at 191.
57. Haynes, 119 F.R.D. at 339.
58. See supra note 50.
59. See In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH., 838 F.2d 1362, 1363 (5th Cir. 1988); Sandsend, 743
S.W.2d at 364 ("It is within the trial court's discretion to determine whether the Hague Convention
procedures should be used as a first resort").
60. In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 838 F.2d at 1363.
61. These criticisms have been most prevalent in the context of the extraterritorial application of
national laws and the so-called jurisdictional rule of reason. See Maier, Interest Balancing and
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 579 (1983); Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian
World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 948-54 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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general unwillingness of lower courts seriously to examine foreign sovereign
interests would appear to bolster suggestions of an inherent institutional inability
of trial courts to perform such a function.
A few of the post-Aerospatiale decisions do evidence conscientious efforts by
lower courts to come to grips with the balance of foreign and U.S. sovereign
interests. In evaluating foreign interests these courts have usually held that
sweeping foreign blocking statutes or policies favoring resort to the Convention
are not entitled to any significant deference by U.S. courts. 62 In the words of one
court, these sorts of foreign statutes and policies are "overly broad and vague"
and thus do not "warrant much deference. ' 63 These courts have instead
demanded a showing of some specific, narrowly tailored foreign interest in the
nondisclosure of particular evidence, such as the protection of trade secrets,
confidential communications, and the like.
64
The same lower courts have adopted what amounts to an analogous approach
to evaluating the U.S. interests at stake in particular discovery disputes. These
courts have usually ordered direct discovery pursuant to U.S. procedural rules,
but only after requiring the party seeking discovery to narrow the scope and
intrusiveness of its U.S. discovery requests.65 Thus, one lower court has
reasoned that "expansive discovery without concomitant relevance is not what
the Court envisioned when it handed down the Arospatiale decision. . . .I
believe that a number of the requests are not 'simple' and may require
streamlining if we are to proceed under the federal rules."
66
A comity analysis, along these lines, that would require a considerable degree
of specificity in the definition of both foreign and U.S. interests has some initial
appeal. At least in principle, this analysis would provide a mechanism for com-
promising extraterritorial discovery disputes by carefully identifying what U.S.
and foreign sovereign interests actually are at stake in particular cases and by
carefully tailoring U.S.-style discovery to avoid compromising relevant foreign
interests. In practical terms, the lower courts' heightened scrutiny of sovereign
interests would mean that extraterritorial discovery would be conducted pursuant
to U.S. procedural rules, but would be more limited than occurs in the purely
domestic context; direct U.S. discovery would also apparently be subject to a
requirement of first use of the Convention where specific and clearly articulated
62. Rich v. KIS Cal., Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 258 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Benton Graphics v.
Uddeholm Corp., 118 F.R.D. 386, 391 (D.N.J. 1987).
63. Rich, 121 F.R.D. at 258.
64. Id.
65. Benton, 118 F.R.D. at 390; see also Rich, 121 F.R.D. at 260; Scarminach v. Goldwell
GmbH, 40 Misc. 2d 103, 531 N.Y.S.2d 188, 191 (Sup. Ct. 1988). These decisions have relied on
the Supreme Court's statement in Aerospatiale that "[elven if a court might be persuaded that a
particular document request was too burdensome or too 'intrusive' to be granted in full . . . it might
well refuse to insist upon the use of Convention procedures before requiring responses to simple
interrogatories or requests for admissions." 482 U.S. at 545 (1987).
66. Benton, 118 F.R.D. at 390; see also Transcript, supra note 54, at 11.
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foreign nondisclosure laws exist. There is undeniably an attractive element of
rough justice and reciprocity about this proposal.
Ultimately, however, this approach is premised on a faulty view of foreign and
U.S. sovereign interests. Specific foreign nondisclosure laws are generally
relevant to the ultimate substantive question whether particular evidence can ever
be produced, not to the procedures governing how such evidence should be
produced. Foreign bank secrecy laws and privileges for confidential relationships
do not reflect a desire that discovery into these matters occur pursuant to the
Convention-instead, these laws generally reflect a prohibition against any
discovery of protected materials. Similarly, in considering U.S. interests, the
lower courts have typically inquired whether particular evidence is really needed
by the U.S. litigant and how intrusive such discovery would be. Again, these
questions are not relevant to the procedure for taking discovery into a particular
matter, but instead go to the ultimate issue of whether particular materials should
be discoverable at all.
All of this suggests that the lower courts that have attempted conscientiously
to apply the Agrospatiale comity analysis have considered the wrong types of
sovereign interests. These courts should be examining the U.S. interest in ob-
taining broad discovery very promptly (rather than somewhat less broadly and less
quickly pursuant to the Convention), not the more generalized question whether
discovery of certain subjects is needed. Conversely, lower courts should inquire
whether the foreign State has expressed a specific interest that particular types of
inquiries be conducted pursuant to the Convention, not whether the foreign State
has indicated that inquiries in a particular field are simply forbidden. Only by
evaluating U.S. and foreign sovereign interests for and against use of the Con-
vention can U.S. courts determine intelligently whether or not use of the Con-
vention is required by comity. Evaluating other interests simply does not bear on
the desirability of requiring resort to the Convention.
V. Other Post-Agrospatiale Issues
Post-Mrospatiale decisions have also dealt with several issues not directly
related to application of the Court's international comity analysis. Three lower
court decisions have considered whether so-called "jurisdictional discovery"-
ordered only with respect to jurisdictional facts against a foreign defendant who
challenges the personal jurisdiction of the U.S. court 67-must be obtained pur-
suant to the Convention. Two courts have rejected the argument that the Con-
vention was the sole basis for extraterritorial discovery until after personal
jurisdiction over the defendant was affirmatively established and held that
67. Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinre, 456 U.S. 694
(1982); In re Marc Rich & Co. AG, 707 F.2d 663, 670 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983);
In re Sealed Case, 832 F.2d 1268, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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"jurisdictional discovery" may proceed directly under U.S. discovery rules. 68
Indeed, the courts apparently were of the view that the possible lack of U.S.
personal jurisdiction over the party from whom discovery was sought was not even
relevant to the Arospatiale comity analysis. One other lower court, in a brief
unpublished order, required jurisdictional discovery to proceed under the Con-
vention, but without offering a rationale for its conclusion. 69 Nevertheless, sound
justifications support this result-a serious question as to the propriety of a U.S.
court's personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant surely ought to be a sig-
nificant factor in a comity analysis weighing U.S. and foreign interests, since the
absence of jurisdiction over the defendant would necessarily also result in an
absence of legitimate U.S. interests in direct discovery.
Two state courts have considered whether or not to require exclusive or first
use of the Convention procedures in ordering extraterritorial discovery pursuant
to state procedural rules. 70 Both courts have concluded that state courts are
bound by the Agrospatiale holding that the Convention is not by its terms
exclusive. 7' Moreover, both lower state courts also followed the international
comity analysis set out in Agrospatiale, without considering whether they might
be permitted to establish either stricter or more lenient requirements for use of the
Convention. 72
VI. Conclusion
Based on these preliminary observations about the application of Agrospatiale,
it is difficult to be enthusiastic about the Court's comity analysis. By both their
words and deeds trial judges have found it difficult to apply the Court's ad hoc
balancing test. Appellate courts have generally refused seriously to scrutinize
application of the Agrospatiale analysis, instead deferring to trial courts. These
courts, in turn, have almost uniformly refused to require resort to what they
perceive as the cumbersome procedures of the Convention. Whatever one might
68. Rich, 121 F.R.D. at 258-60. See Transcript, supra note 54.
69. Jenco v. Martech Int'l, Inc., 1988 WL 54733 (E.D. La. May 19, 1988). Importantly, Jenco
also involved depositions to be held on the territory of the Foreign State (Norway). Other courts have
concluded that as to discovery actually conducted abroad, the Convention must be used. E.g., Scotch
Whiskey Ass'n v. Majestic Distilling Co., No. 88-808 (D. Md. Nov. 30, 1988).
70. Airospatiale arose from an action in federal district court and technically involved only the
interplay between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Hague Evidence Convention. The
Supreme Court did not expressly address the effect of either the Convention or the doctrine of
international comity on state discovery rules. See Westin & Born, Applying the A6rospatiale Decision
in State Court Proceedings, 26 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 297 (1988).
71. Scarminach v. Goldwell GmbH, 140 Misc. 2d 103, 531 N.Y.S. 2d 188, 190 (Sup. Ct. 1988);
Sandsend Fin. Consultants v. Wood, 743 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, no
writ) ("In construing a treaty . . . this Court is duty bound to follow Supreme Court precedent.").
72. See Westin & Born, supra note 69, at 303-11, arguing that state courts are required, as a
matter of federal common law, to apply a comity analysis that is at least as strict in requiring use of
the Convention as that in Agrospatiale, and that in certain circumstances state courts might be
permitted to adopt an even stricter first use or exclusivity requirement.
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think of the desirability of this result, it is hardly the outcome that foreign states
would expect from a comity analysis expressly designed to reflect "the spirit of
cooperation in which a domestic tribunal approaches the resolution of cases
touching the laws and interests of other sovereign states.''
73
Ironically, some lower courts have also required U.S. litigants to reduce the
scope of their direct U.S. extraterritorial discovery requests. As a result, post-
Agrospatiale decisions have probably devised a procedure for extraterritorial
discovery calculated to satisfy almost nobody. Foreign States and witnesses will
be unhappy that the Convention's mechanisms and procedural safeguards are
ignored; U.S. litigants will be dissatisfied when their customary U.S.-style dis-
covery rights are restricted and will be even more disappointed if (as is likely)
foreign courts refuse to enforce their U.S. judgments because of noncompliance
with the Convention; 74 and finally, U.S. trial courts are themselves encumbered
with a comity analysis that they find difficult and unproductive, and that ultimately
has little relevance to their inevitable decisions to order direct discovery. It may
of course be that, at the end of the day, this system offers some sort of rough
justice-less extensive and less intrusive discovery requests fulfilled unilaterally
under more expeditious U.S. discovery rules. Nonetheless, any result with what
tentatively appears to be this array of disadvantages should receive careful scrutiny
before it becomes standard U.S. practice.
73. Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United States Dist. Ct., 482 U.S. 522, 543
n.27 (1987).
74. Cf. Landgericht Berlin, Urteil vom 13.6.1989 (Docket No. 20.0.314188), reprinted in Recht
der Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW 1989) at 989-90.
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